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The Analysis School and Feminism: Intersection, Explanation and a Challenge 
Stephen Kemp 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I will compare the views of reflexivity and the situated character of knowledge in On 
the Beginning of Social Inquiry and in some feminist perspectives.  One of my aims is to draw out 
what I see as similarities between the two, which both offer insightful views about reflexivity and its 
role in social scientific inquiry.  These similarities are intriguing insofar as they arose despite the 
apparent absence of an interchange of ideas between feminist thinkers and the authors of On the 
Beginning of Social Inquiry.  A second aim of the piece is to analyse how these similarities might have 
come about.  The third task of the piece is to critically probe the presuppositions of both 
approaches, particularly in relation to how successfully they break from the assumptions of 
approaches that they are rejecting.  And the final concern will be to consider whether each approach 
has ideas that can help take the other’s project forward. 
In a book about On the Beginning of Social Inquiry (OBSI), an extensive introduction to the text is 
unnecessary.  However let me note here that it is an early collaborative work by writers who 
sometimes refer to themselves as proponents of ‘Analysis’.  The writers involved have gone on to 
build up an impressive body of work addressing questions of reflexivity, value and interpretation in 
the social sciences (see for example Blum and McHugh, 1984; Raffel, 2013).  More relevant to this 
volume, however, is an introduction to feminist approaches to reflexivity.  The first point that I want 
to make is that the writers of OBSI shared theoretical premises to a large extent, whereas this is less 
true of feminist defenders of reflexivity.  For this reason, it would be quite questionable to give an 
outline of feminist approaches to reflexivity as if all shared a single presupposition.  One, admittedly 
crude, way to distinguish feminist approaches is to separate those who are more sympathetic to 
‘realism’ and those who are more sympathetic to ‘constructionist’ approaches to social inquiry.  Of 
course the usage of each of these terms is complex and contested in itself.  But, roughly speaking, 
those feminists who have realist commitments are inclined to see society as a hierarchically 
structured entity, the characteristics of which can be more or less successfully grasped.  For such 
thinkers, being reflexive involves understanding one’s position within this hierarchy and its bearing 
on the knowledge that one generates.  One early contribution to feminist debates about reflexivity 
with somewhat realist commitments comes from Sandra Harding.  Harding is best known for her 
espousal of feminist standpoint theory and for producing a classic typology to situate it in relation to 
other approaches, but her 1983 article ‘Common causes: toward a reflexive feminist theory’ 
addressed the reflexive location of knowledge.  In this article, Harding states: 
‘…we must be able to explain, understand and criticize our own inquiry practices in terms of 
the very same kinds of causes of practices and beliefs which our theories claim structure the 
social order.’ (Harding, 1983: 31) 
Harding’s use of the terms ‘structure’ and ‘social order’ is not misleading here, and she uses them 
elsewhere in the article along with the claim that the ‘sex/gender system’ is the key discovery of 
feminist research (Harding, 1983: 33).  For Harding, social structures shape what can be known and 
reflexivity involves thinking about what these structures permit different groups to ‘know’ at 
different junctures (Harding, 1983: 38).   
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By way of contrast to realist-oriented approaches, feminist approaches to reflexivity which are more 
strongly indebted to constructionist thought are less keen to talk of structure, cause and system, and 
more inclined to argue for the importance of language and difference in understanding society.  In 
particular, in constructionist forms of feminism there is a tendency to see language as a crucially 
constitutive part of social relations rather than as a medium which allows a better or worse 
representation of reality (see e.g. Miller, 2000).  Arguments for this position are often linked to post-
structuralist writers like Foucault (1972) and Derrida (1976) who have, in different ways, rejected 
representational accounts of language in favour of arguing for its constitutive force.  An acceptance 
of the argument that language has a constitutive role in society is closely linked to feminist 
enthusiasm for reflexivity because the inquirer’s language-use then becomes a crucial topic to 
explore, and inquirers are encouraged to engage in self-examination in order to understand their 
contribution to the account of the world that they offer (e.g. Mauthner and Doucet, 2003).  In doing 
so, inquirers explore the ways in which their own social positioning and background has shaped the 
knowledge-claims that they produce.  Here I want to explore the links between feminist 
constructionism and the Analysis approach, because of the intriguing similarities and overlaps, 
although I will also be noting relevant differences.1  
 
2. Exploring the Similarities Between On the Beginning of Social Inquiry and Feminist 
Constructionism   
I want to begin my comparison between the early Analysis work and feminist constructionism by 
considering the status of language and linguistic utterances in each approach.  Crucial to the 
approach taken in On the Beginning of Social Inquiry, is the idea that any act of writing or speech is 
not independent or self-subsistent.  Rather, speech is dependent on something else:   
 ‘Since we treat every finding, every speech, every chapter in this book as a mere surface 
reflection of what makes them possible, since no speech is in this sense perfect or self-
sufficient, speaking and writing is always from the perspective of analysis an inadequate 
activity.’ (McHugh et al, 1974: 3) 
What is it that speech, then, is dependent on?  For the Analysis school, it is dependent on its 
auspices, its grounds.  It is these that ‘make what is said possible, sensible, conceivable’ (McHugh et 
al, 1974: 2).  But how are these auspices and grounds to be conceived?  I would suggest that the 
Wittgensteinian conception of ‘language games’ is somewhat helpful in explicating this.  In the first 
place, language is crucial here.  Speech is embedded in language that makes it possible and 
intelligible, rather than such speech being free-standing.  Using another term that the Analysis 
school favour, speech is grounded in ‘convention’.  However, language itself is not free-standing but 
is grounded in interactions with others, and here we can see the relevance of the idea of language 
games, activities that are conducted with others.  These others are, for McHugh et al, a community 
                                                          
1 In making a separation between realist and constructionist approaches to feminism I am setting aside a 
tantalising issue about the possible convergence of the two.  It might be argued that in seeing social influences 
as shaping the understandings of inquirers, constructionists are adopting a ‘realist’ attitude, i.e. seeing these 
social influences as something that can be represented in their own discourse (cf Latour, 1992).  It is this kind 
of point that leads Gillian Rose to argue for the uncertainty of self-representation as well as alter-
representation when exploring the appropriate approach to reflexivity (Rose, 1997) 
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of language users.  It is in understanding the way in which community is conceived of by the Analysis 
school that the connotative limitations of the term ‘games’ may become apparent.  This is because 
McHugh et al argue that communities are characterised by deeply held moral commitments, which 
are expressed in their speech (see for example McHugh et al, 1974: 79).   
This focus on the grounding of speech in community reflects what might be called the ‘ontological’ 
orientation of Analysis, which is consonant with their interest in Heidegger’s work.  Although 
language-usage is crucial to their approach, proponents of Analysis fundamentally connect it to a 
concern with the deep character of community and relationality.  As well as focusing on moral 
commitments, OBSI explores the dialectic of identity and questions of self and other, as apparent in 
the chapters dealing with Snubs and Travel.  In their analysis of Snubs, McHugh et al explore the 
deep assumptions that are revealed by reflecting on interactions where one participant fails to 
accept the greeting of the other.  These assumptions are revealed to relate to the way in which an 
actor giving a greeting attempts to collect together self and other in a mutual recognition of their 
sameness whereas the proponent of a snub withholds such recognition.  Likewise, in their 
considerations on Travel, the exponents of Analysis are concerned with the relation of the traveller 
both to the community s/he leaves and to the community s/he visits, exploring the superficial and 
uncommitted character of sociality embodied in travelling.  From these examples, we can see that 
the Analysis approach is fundamentally interested in considering the grounds in community and 
relationality out of which speech and activity emerge.  And it is because they argue that any speech 
act reflects these grounds but cannot ultimately capture them that McHugh et al argue for the 
situated and always limited character of such speech. 
In the first significant overlap that we are noting, feminist constructionists also wish to avoid the 
idea that speech and writing is self-subsistent.  One way in which this concern has had a specific 
significance for feminists is that in promoting an understanding of the social, cultural and political 
character of gender relations, they have been concerned to challenge speech about sex and gender 
that presented itself as ‘natural’ or as simple ‘common sense’ (for one example see Davies, 2003: 1-
2) .  The ‘obvious facts’ of sex and gender were being disrupted by feminists and this encouraged a 
concern to understand the non-surface, non-obvious roots of the naturalisation of gender in speech 
and writing.  In order to theorize the challenge to common utterance, feminist constructionists often 
drew on structuralist and especially post-structuralist writers.   
Probably the most common reference point within feminist constructionism is the Foucault-inspired 
notion of discourse.  The term ‘discourse’ has a wide range of meanings, of course, and some of this 
plurality comes through in variations within feminist approaches.  Nevertheless, one common usage 
involves feminists referring to a discourse as a relatively structured and organized set of ideas and 
practices that shapes possible forms of subjectivity (see for example, Weedon, 1997).  Although this 
is not always fully explicit, discourse in these usages seems to be seen as something underlying what 
is said, and thus the ground of utterances and their meaning.  To use an example discussed in 
Cameron (1998), when analysing why the word ‘Ladies’ is used on a toilet door feminist 
poststructuralists would not treat the meaning of the word as self-subsistent, or as reflecting 
nature/biology, but would look at the linguistic and practical discursive grounds which make sense of 
the use of the term “Ladies’” rather than e.g. “Women”, and indeed make sense of the practice of 
separating toilet facilities by sex/gender.   
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Another line of feminist constructionism takes its inspiration from Derrida.  In her work on 
‘Rhizovocality’, Alecia Youngblood Jackson explores the non-innocent character of the voices of 
participants within research and states that on a poststructuralist view  
‘…voice is not transparent; it can no longer express an absolute, ideal, essential meaning 
that is present/conscious to itself.’ (Jackson, 2003: 702) 
Here Jackson is drawing on Derrida’s idea that speech cannot be solidly grounded, but relies for its 
meaning on elusive traces back through previous usages (see Derrida, 1976).  And this kind of 
argument takes the feminist challenge to ‘natural’ speech a step further insofar as it questions not 
just the authenticity of utterances that naturalize gender but also the speech of those suffering from 
gendering processes in society, which is not seen as grounded in the unquestionable realities of their 
lives. 
When discussing Analysis, I referred to its ontological concern with questions of community and 
relationality.  Although a concern with these elements is undoubtedly present in some feminist 
analysis, it is tempting to suggest that discourse, language, and indeed power, are the fundamental 
ontological entities for feminist constructionism.  That is to say, for the latter approach it is the 
combined operation of discourse, language and power that works to create differentiated and 
unequal forms of identity that are considered the key features of society.  I will return to questions 
of inequality and community in the Concluding section of the chapter.    
So far, we have considered an initial similarity between Analysis and feminist constructionism in 
their accounts of the non-presence of speech and writing.   But in each case, this analysis of 
language is then developed further in order to generate a critical account of certain forms of speech 
and writing.  In essence, what is criticised is those forms of utterance which fail to recognize their 
dependence on a background that is not full present within them. 
For McHugh et al, the form of speech that involves a misrecognition of the character of language is 
‘concrete’ speech.  They state: 
‘Concrete speech ignores its achieved character, violates itself and conceives of itself as first.  
When concrete speech attempts to locate its grounds it points to “external” nature, to 
“internal” mind(s), to the self-organizing activity of speech itself, or to past events under the 
delusion that such “sources” are external to speech.’ (McHugh et al, 1974: 15) 
In this quote, the proponents of Analysis outline two ways that those who see speech as concrete 
can be mistaken about their speech.  One is to believe that speech is ‘first’, which involves failing to 
see that for speech to occur there need to be auspices and grounds which are the basis of its 
production.  The other mistake occurs when proponents of concrete speech do admit that their 
utterances have grounds, but wrongly identify the character of these.   
Let’s explore one example of misidentified grounds.  According to the Analysis school, proponents of 
concrete speech may believe that their descriptions are grounded in nature itself.  We can take this 
to mean that concrete speakers believe that representations of natural objects are underwritten by 
the state of those objects in themselves.  It’s worth pointing out here that even concrete speakers 
are unlikely to hold that all uses of language give an accurate representation of their subject matter.  
If they did, the common aim of distinguishing between true and false representations would be 
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pointless – all representations would be true.  What is more typical is the idea that true belief is 
grounded in nature itself.  Who is it that accepts this kind of position?  One such theoretical grouping 
was only beginning to emerge when OBSI was published, and can be called realist, relevant sub-
categories being critical realism (e.g. Bhaskar, 1975; Archer, 1995) and scientific realism (e.g. Psillos, 
1999).  Although realists, at times, recognize aspects of the mediating character of representation, 
they also have a strong commitment to the existence of real objects and processes, and see theories 
and beliefs as oriented to representing these.   
In OBSI positivism is a key approach that is identified as having a concrete conception of speech.  
This might seem puzzling as if we look at, for example, the logical positivists, they often harbour 
doubts about grounding science in reality, in things-themselves, seeing these as problematic 
metaphysical concepts.  The concern to avoid a metaphysical attempt to use reality as a ground 
motivates logical positivists to instead treat ‘sense experience’ as the basic element of analysis.  And 
indeed, many logical positivists might be characterised as conventionalist in character, although 
there were disputes within the school (see Hanfling, 1981 for discussion).  I think this puzzle about 
the accusation that positivists have a concrete conception of speech can be resolved by noting the 
sheer variety of uses of ‘positivism’ as a term, both by those who were happy to classify themselves 
as such, and by critics (see Bryant, 1985).  Thus the term positivism can be used to refer not just to 
logical positivists but also to those practitioners who adopt a scientistic orientation and have an 
unproblematic confidence that their claims are grounded in the characteristics of reality (see 
McHugh et al (1974:75) for how they characterise the ‘positivist’ programme). 
For the proponents of Analysis, the alternative to a misguidedly concrete conception of speech is 
speech that acknowledges its grounds.  This is easier said than done.  As McHugh et al state: 
‘…to be caught up in the activity of formulation is to face away from one’s own fundamental 
grounds through which those formulations come about.’ (McHugh et al, 1974: 3) 
Thus, in OBSI it is argued that speaking turns one away from one’s grounds, making their 
recuperation very difficult.  For McHugh et al there is no way to completely resolve this difficulty.  
However, that does not mean that there is no way at all to avoid the perils of concrete speech.  
What McHugh et al recommend is the value of collaboration.  Collaborators who listen to ones 
utterances or read ones words can help to identify the grounds of that speech (McHugh et al, 1974: 
3-4).  Of course, the response of a collaborator does not bring the analysis to a conclusion, as this 
response also needs to be situated in its own grounds, as part of an ongoing process.  Nevertheless, 
this ongoing situating process is seen by McHugh et al as a way to deepen one’s understanding of 
what is spoken or written. 
As with the Analysis school, feminist constructionists have been very critical of utterances, 
particularly knowledge claims, that do not acknowledge their situated character.  One key feminist 
work which discusses these issues is by Donna Haraway.  Haraway has written a range of insightful 
and provocative discussions which make connections between sex/gender, knowledge, science, 
technology and animals (1990, 2003).  Here I want to discuss a quote from her well-regarded piece 
‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective’ 
(1988).  Even the title of this article, with its reference to ‘situated knowledge’ cues us in to her 
feminist concern that knowledge claims should be located.  Haraway states: 
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‘I would like to insist on the embodied nature of all vision and so reclaim the sensory system 
that has been used to signify a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze from 
nowhere.  This is the gaze that mythically inscribes all marked bodies, that makes the 
unmarked category claim the power to see and not be seen, to represent while escaping 
representation’ (1988: 581)  
Haraway is here critiquing forms of knowledge that she presents as oriented to seeing but not being 
seen, forms of knowledge that do not admit to their own bases, presenting themselves as from 
nowhere.  In this category Haraway places techno-scientific forms of knowledge including those 
drawn on for military purposes.  But it is also worth mentioning that from feminist perspectives the 
limitations of existing positions are often connected with the influence of a masculine orientation to 
the social world.  So, for at least some feminists, it is an abstract masculine mode of thought and 
action which tries to conceal its basis by obscuring its roots (Haraway, 1988: 577-8).   
In terms of a positive response to these issues, many feminist constructionists have argued that a 
commitment to reflexivity is an important way to deal with the problems of the ‘gaze from 
nowhere’.  On this view, it is crucial that those making knowledge-claims situate themselves, 
acknowledge that they are coming from a particular position, social background and perspective.  
One of the questions that has arisen from this feminist emphasis on situatedness is how those in 
differently situated perspectives can have meaningful interactions with one another, and I want to 
return to this issue in the final section of the chapter. 
I will return to this issue in the final section of the chapter, but now want to consider one more 
overlap between the Analysis school and feminist constructionism.  This is that both approaches 
criticise the idea that moral and political commitments are ‘private’ matters to be excluded from 
research.  This argument is made in quite a subtle way in On the Beginning of Social Inquiry and it 
will be interesting to explore the way it comes up in McHugh et al’s critique of the positivist notion 
of ‘bias’.  For positivists, bias is a problematic feature of research that features it.  One important 
way it is seen to operate is as a form of favouritism towards a particular answer to a research 
question (McHugh et al, 1974: 49).  Where does this favouritism come from?  On the Analysis 
account, positivists see favouritism as an intrusion of the private interests of the inquirer into public, 
communal, discourse: 
‘When we fail to see community in an inquiry we are expected, according to the rules of the 
scientific language game, to look for his [sic] private interests as the means for 
understanding his inquiry.  When we find such interests, we are charging bias.’ (McHugh et 
al, 1974: 63) 
A further intriguing point that McHugh et al make is that many positivist treatments argue that bias 
cannot be completely removed from scientific inquiry (McHugh et al, 1974: 51).  What this means is 
that positivists both deplore the influence of private self-interest on public inquiry but also admit 
that it cannot be removed. 
The treatment of bias in OBSI is complex and I cannot cover all aspects of it here.  For our purposes, 
a key move that McHugh et al make is the argument that what positivists see as favouritism is, in 
fact, commitment (1974: 51-2).  When taken this way, what positivists are recognizing in their 
remarks about the ineradicable character of bias is, implicitly, the ineradicable character of the 
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commitment of researchers.  And for members of the Analysis school commitment is not something 
that should not be disavowed or proclaimed to be problematic.  Rather, it is part of the grounds of 
an activity which can be (at least partially) recollected through the collaborative work recommended 
in OBSI.  Furthermore, these grounds are not to be understood to be private features of an individual 
inquirer but as shared between members of a community of language use who share forms of life. 
Turning to feminism, we can see that a key tenet of feminist methodology has been a rejection of 
the idea that moral and political commitments are private, and best kept outside of the research 
process.  This rejection has been made on the basis of at least two arguments.  Firstly, feminists have 
been very critical of the public/private distinction and the idea that there is a principled division to 
be made between the two (for a discussion by a key feminist thinker see Pateman, 1983).  This 
critique has been made on various grounds, but one important aspect, of course, identifies problems 
with the socio-cultural association of men with the public realm and women with the private realm, 
an association which connects men with paid work and political activity, and women with the home, 
domesticity, and so on.   
Secondly, feminists have been keen to emphasize that morality and politics, as well as personal 
experience, are very much part of the research process.  Some feminists would argue that this is 
even the case in the natural sciences, Sandra Harding being one example (see Harding, 1991).  But 
there is almost a consensus amongst feminists that in social inquiry a researcher’s moral values, 
political leanings and experiences have an influence on the research that they undertake.  To pick 
just one example, Gail Letherby is a feminist researcher who states that: 
‘Feminist work highlights the fact that the researchers’ choice of methods, of research topic 
and of study group population are always political acts’ (Letherby, 2003: 4)   
And although feminists are concerned with the moral and political commitments in their own 
research, they are also keen to highlight that even research which seems ‘neutral’ or ‘un-committed’ 
is still shaped by value commitments.  One particular area of focus here has been the attempt to 
look at purportedly neutral research and expose the hidden masculine values shaping research 
questions, methods and findings.  One classic example of this is Ann Oakley’s (1981) critique of the 
advice given to interviewers by methodologists.  Oakley argues that this advice encouraged 
interviewers to strongly constrain their engagement with interviewees, deflecting any questions 
directed at the interviewer and operating almost like a mechanical-recording machine.  Oakley 
contends that this is not a ‘neutral’ way to conduct interviews but one which is shaped by a 
masculine ideal of the detached, unemotional, unresponsive self, this ideal being premised on a 
rejection of feminine emotionality, engagement and so on. 
 
3. Can we Explain the Similarities? 
Having outlined a number of similarities between feminist constructionism and the Analysis school, I 
now want to address this as a puzzle: how is it that these similarities exist?  This puzzle would be 
very easy to solve if it turned out that members of the Analysis school were an early influence on 
feminist constructionists or vice versa.  But this simply does not seem to be the case.  On the 
Beginning of Social Inquiry was not cited by feminist constructionist writers in the 1970s and 1980s, 
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and has only occasionally been cited by them since (see e.g. Miller, 2000).  And feminist views are 
not cited or discussed in On the Beginning of Social Inquiry, although they have occasionally been 
considered by later sympathisers with Analysis such as Bonner (2001).  Given this apparent lack of 
mutual influence, how are we to explain the overlap?   
One possibility would be to call on the kind of theoretical apparatus Foucault develops in The Order 
of Things (2002 [1970]).  In this work Foucault argues that different domains of knowledge – those 
relating to life, language and labour – share deep assumptions that give them a common underlying 
structure.  These deep assumptions have been transformed at particular points in history, with the 
result that theories and concepts in the areas also transformed in character.  Foucault called these 
deep assumptions ‘epistemes’, and he was particularly interested in assumptions about the 
appropriate way to order objects and those addressing the relationship between words and things.  
We have already seen that the question of the relation between words and things, or more broadly 
between words and their subject matter (thing-like or otherwise) is a concern of the Analysis school 
and feminist constructionism.  Foucault’s approach also seems relevant in that he is undoubtedly 
intending to provide an account of how different knowledge-producers can share assumptions when 
they have not influenced one another.  However, in my view there are unsatisfactory elements to 
Foucault’s analysis of epistemes.  For one thing, Foucault implies that epistemes are not able to be 
grasped by knowledge-producers that operate within them (see for example Foucault, 2002: 307).  It 
would be rather ironic if the shared presuppositions of schools that are committed to exploring their 
own assumptions were intrinsically unavailable to them.  However, it seems to me that Foucault 
does not really offer an argument to support his claim.  Secondly, Foucault’s epistemes are 
somewhat mysterious in their operation.  Foucault himself acknowledged that he does not give an 
explanation of what caused them to change (2002: xiii-xiv).  As well as this, we can point out that he 
doesn’t give an explanation of why some forms of knowledge are subject to a specific episteme and 
others are not.2  Thus, even if we were take up the idea that feminist constructionism and the 
Analysis School share an episteme, it would be not clear why they fall within this episteme whilst, 
say, realists do not. 
As a tentative alternative, I want to suggest that the solution to the puzzle lies in another factor: 
shared influences.  This might seem an odd claim.  After all, there is a case for seeing the three main 
influences on On the Beginning of Social Inquiry as Wittgenstein, Heidegger and ethnomethodology.  
Although there is important feminist work in the ethnomethodological tradition (particularly West 
and Zimmerman, 1987) I think it would be inaccurate to see ethnomethodology as a major direct 
influence on feminist constructionism.  Likewise, neither Wittgenstein nor Heidegger are direct 
sources of influence on feminist thought in any substantial way.  Nevertheless, I think there is a case 
for seeing one of these writers as having had an important indirect influence on feminist thought: 
Heidegger.  The key point here is that Heidegger had an influence on feminism, but mediated 
through the ideas of Foucault.   
So how did Heidegger influence each approach?  Starting with On the Beginning of Social Inquiry, we 
might infer the influence of Heidegger from the way that communicative acts are seen as necessarily 
based in a ‘Being’ that ‘does not show itself in itself’ (McHugh et al, 1974: 16), although there are 
                                                          
2 Gary Gutting notes that Foucault is unclear even on this point, sometimes characterising his approach as one 
that does deal with specific regions of knowledge and at other points characterising his approach as one that 
applies to Western thought in general (Gutting, 1989: 178). 
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only brief references to Heidegger in the text (e.g. McHugh et al, 1974: 110, 149).  Broadly speaking, 
I would argue that the Analysis school follow Heidegger in seeing speech as “grounded” in a 
contingent linguistic community.   From a Heideggerian perspective this applies as much to scientific 
speech as other forms of utterance (Gadamer, 1981: 162-3), and this is developed in OBSI through 
an analysis of positivist practices in the social sciences.   
Turning to feminist constructionism, it is fairly clear, as noted above, that proponents of this 
approach were influenced and inspired by various aspects of Foucault’s analysis of language and 
subjectivity.  One concern of Foucault was to challenge the idea of a trans-historical ‘subject’, that is, 
the idea that individual actors and knowers might have certain features that were the same no 
matter what socio-historical era they were located within.  This was taken up by feminist 
constructionists who argued that subjects are crucially shaped by socio-historically located 
discourses, such that subjects’ self-conceptions are (at least in part) a contingent feature of these 
discourses rather than tapping into some generalized form of rationality or indeed into direct 
empirical apprehension.  Of course, there is a missing link in this attempt to connect feminism and 
Heidegger here, and that is the connection between Foucault and Heidegger.  I admit that there are 
markedly different views about the character of this link (see for example Ijsseling, 1986; Sluga, 
2006; Dreyfus, 1996).  One likely reason for this is that although Foucault insisted in a late interview 
on the importance of Heidegger’s writings to his development (reprinted in Foucault, 1988), 
Foucault made very few explicit references to Heidegger’s ideas in his work.  The line of argument I 
want to put forward here is that there is a meaningful connection between Foucault and Heidegger 
in that both are concerned with the contingent and historical character of subjects, and in the 
important role of language in producing this (Ijsseling, 1986).  In this respect their views are in 
marked contrast to those of Hegel, who saw the subject as historical but importantly as non-
contingent, as travelling through necessary phases of development on the way to the culmination of 
spirit.  Thus, I accept Foucault’s remarks about the importance of Heidegger to the development of 
his thought and see this influence as being taken up and developed by feminist constructionists.3   
I don’t want to overstate my confidence in the explanation that I have provided, but nevertheless I 
do think it is worth taking seriously the view that the overlap between the Analysis school and 
feminist constructionism derives, at least in part from the shared (though in one case mediated) 
influence of Heidegger.  Of course, to situate these approaches in terms of their influences is not to 
reduce their ideas to those of predecessors, and both feminist constructionism and the Analysis 
school push forward our understanding of the situated character of language and subject-hood.  In 
particular, both are concerned not with these ideas as broad philosophical assertions, but with 
developing ways of conducting and reflecting on social inquiry that take seriously the situated 
character of the social researcher, and make this a matter for exploration. 
 
4.  Feminist Constructionism and On the Beginning of Social Inquiry: An Issue 
                                                          
3 It is perhaps also worth considering here that feminists have also drawn on Derrida’s thought (see for 
example the aforementioned Jackson, 2003) and that Heidegger was also an influence on Derrida (Dews, 1987: 
5) 
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Having explored the similarities in the commitments of Analysis and feminist constructionist 
positions, I would now like to consider one problematic issue with these approaches.  This relates to 
the question of what a reflexive orientation can hope to achieve.  As we have seen, both feminist 
constructionists and members of the Analysis school place a great deal of attention on exploring the 
situated character of their own knowledge production, and see the value of locating the grounds on 
which social inquiry is based.  The issue I want to explore here is the question of what the ideal form 
of reflexive knowledge is understood to be.  What I want to argue is that there is potentially a 
tension in the work of the analysis school and in some feminist constructionist accounts between a 
recognition of the situated character of knowledge and the ideal of knowledge being upheld.  The 
particular problem here is the way in which both approaches seem to, at least sometimes, uphold 
transparency as an ideal. 
Let me start to develop this with a quote from On the Beginning of Social Inquiry: 
 ‘…analysis brings to light the contradiction which every speech re-presents by treating the 
speech as an appearance of that which grounds it.  The problem for analysis is always the 
difference…the success of the solution to a problem does not reside in its elimination of a 
difference – but in making the difference between speech and language transparent.’ 
(McHugh et al, 1974: 18) 
Here, one of the contributions of analysis is held to be the way that it reveals that concrete speech is 
not identical to its grounds.  This is presented as a matter of making this difference ‘transparent’. A 
similar invocation of transparency emerges in the later discussion of the question of positivism and 
its ideas of bias.  McHugh et al state: 
 ‘We do not reject bias, but we make its claim transparent by showing how it rests upon a 
particular version of knowledge and how this version of knowledge formulates adequate 
speech as speech which accurately describes things’ (McHugh et al, 1974: 66) 
The idea of transparency is invoked in this case as a way of characterising how the grounds of 
positivist conceptions of bias have been revealed in the process of Analysis. 
The idea of ‘transparency’ is also invoked at times by feminist constructionists.  As an example, let us 
consider the widely cited feminist methodologists Mauthner and Doucet.  In their article ‘Reflexive 
Accounts and Accounts of Reflexivity in Qualitative Data Analysis’ (2003) they argue that researchers 
need to be aware of the various epistemological and ontological conceptions that shape their work:  
Mauthner and Doucet state: 
 ‘We suggest that the particular conceptions employed are less important than the 
epistemological accountability involved in making these conceptions as transparent as 
possible for the readers of our research accounts…’ (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003: 424). 
I should acknowledge that these writers don’t say that background conceptions can be fully 
transparent.  Nevertheless, the idea that they should be as transparent as possible, that 
transparency is an ideal, is clearly advocated here. 
Moving into a critical mode, what strikes me about the idea of transparency is that it seems to 
invoke an idea of representation that is actually being rejected by both approaches.  It seems to 
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imply a merging of the representation into the represented.  This is because when we think of 
transparency, we think of a layer that is see-through, that allows what is behind it to come through 
undistorted and unaltered.  But both the Analysis approach and feminist constructionists argue in 
their core accounts that this is not how representation works.  They argue that representation is not 
direct, that concepts and utterances are not ‘see through’, but that they necessarily have a 
thickness, a contribution of their own. 
If this point stands, then perhaps what is needed is a different concept or metaphor to deal with 
what is being advocated.  It is interesting to ponder such an alternative, as many potential 
candidates seem ‘realist’ in their presuppositions, in a way that is out of keeping with the non-realist 
presuppositions of these approaches.  So talk about ‘revealing’ the background concepts, or 
‘revealing’ the relation between speech and its grounds, would seem to involve a commitment to 
unmasking appearances and showing the reality behind.   ‘Displaying’ is perhaps a bit more neutral, 
and does not have the same connotation of unmasking.  But arguably it is still realist, in that it 
implies that those who are displaying are ‘showing’ what really is there.  Once again, we see that the 
lingering realism within many such concepts and metaphors makes them unsuitable to replace the 
notion of transparency.   
Of course, there is not space in the remainder of this chapter to develop a substantial alternative.  
But let me float, if only briefly, a possible conceptualization that does not have an obviously realist 
orientation.  This is the idea that analysts might be seen as ‘accounting for’ something, taken to 
mean ‘giving a satisfactory account of’ that subject matter.  So, in the feminist case, what we might 
say is that it is important to ‘account for’ the presuppositions of the research.  And in the Analysis 
case the goal would be to give a satisfactory account of, say, the relation between some form of 
speech and the language that underlies it.  The advantage of this formulation is that there is no 
implication that the analysis in question needs to disappear (become transparent) to be successful.  
Rather, success is translated into a matter of giving a satisfactory account.  Of course, there is a 
degree of vagueness in the idea of a ‘satisfactory account’.  However, this vagueness may be 
analytically advantageous insofar as it does not require that inquirers set up foundational criteria 
from which to judge the adequacy of their accounts, or identify a state of perfect knowledge as an 
ideal.   
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to ask of this idea of a ‘satisfactory account’: ‘satisfactory for whom?’ 
and ‘satisfactory on what basis?’  Social constructionists have often linked these questions together, 
arguing that different social groups frequently have different criteria for judging beliefs such that 
what is a satisfactory account for one group of inquirers may not be satisfactory for another.  I would 
follow constructionists on this point.  However, those who are inclined towards relativism are likely 
to add that there is no reasonable way of deciding between criteria, and thus there is no way for a 
group of inquirers to justify its reliance on one set of criteria rather than another.  This being so, the 
relativist would argue, satisfaction with an account, as it is derived from an arbitrarily accepted set 
of criteria, is arbitrary itself.   
I want to resist this argument.  I agree with relativists that there is no meta-criterion which inquirers 
can use to decide which criteria are justified and which are unjustified.  And I likewise accept that 
there is no algorithmic procedure that inquirers can use to decide between criteria.  However, this 
does not mean that inquirers cannot use contingent reasoning and argumentation to give a 
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reasonable defence (in the sense of giving reasons) for adopting the criteria that they use.  We see 
debates of this kind in philosophy frequently, such as debates about the merits of criteria such as 
predictive power and parsimony as means to assess natural scientific theories (e.g. Leplin, 1997; 
Baker 2003).  And in defending their criteria, inquirers are giving reasons for accepting an account as 
satisfactory, in the context of those criteria.  
A relativist might respond to this by arguing that in giving reasons for criteria, inquirers must in turn 
be invoking some criteria which makes those reasons good ones.  And if different groups have 
different views about which of these higher-level criteria are justified then the debate will go in 
circles rather than moving forward.  I admit this is a possibility.  But debates often don’t seem to go 
that way.  They frequently seem to involve not disagreements that we can see no way to resolve, but 
ones that we feel that discussion and perhaps the collection of evidence can have a positive bearing 
on.4  This process may not be simple; it may be very drawn out and extended.  Nevertheless it does 
involve inquirers in making reasoned arguments in defence of their approach.  And, this being the 
case, until such debates lead inquirers to change the criteria that they use they can reasonably 
defend judgements based on those criteria as satisfactory.  Thus, my (sketchy) answers to the 
questions posed before are as follows. For whom is the account satisfactory? For the group of 
inquirers who uphold the criteria on which its satisfactory character is judged.  On what basis is the 
account judged satisfactory?  On the basis of consistency with the criteria upheld by the group of 
inquirers, criteria that they can give a contingently reasonable defence of using when debating with 
proponents of alternative criteria. 
To note one further point, an emphasis on ‘accounting for’ some phenomenon rather than rendering 
it ‘transparent’ has the advantage for both the analysis school and feminist constructionism that it 
emphasizes the work that it is done by the analyst.  Whether attempting to give an account of one’s 
own presuppositions or the presuppositions of another approach, the analyst is still engaging in 
work, and it is exactly this kind of work that feminist constructionists and the Analysis school are 
interested in exploring.  This seems to make ‘accounting for’ an appropriate concept for the theories 
of inquiry promoted by feminist constructionism and Analysis. 
 
5.  Conclusion: The Future of Reflexivity? 
Up until this point in the chapter I have been focusing on the perhaps surprising set of overlaps 
between the work of the Analysis school and feminist constructionism.  To conclude the discussion I 
would like to argue that each approach has something that they could offer the other that would 
help further develop how each approach deals with questions of sociality and reflexivity.   
Beginning with the potential contribution of Analysis to feminist constructionism, this relates to the 
possibility that feminist reflexive analysis can have atomising or fragmenting effects.  We saw above 
that feminist constructionists are concerned to situate knowers, but it is relevant to emphasize that 
this is frequently done by encouraging knowers to locate themselves within intersecting social 
inequalities.  That is to say, feminist constructionists believe that knowers should locate themselves 
                                                          
4 My suspicion is that this is because such debates rarely involve two groups whose sets of criteria are such 
that they share no criteria at all.  What is much more common is that groups agree on and use some criteria 
but disagree about others.  The points of agreement can then be drawn on as part of resolving disagreements. 
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within social constructed patterns of gender inequality, ethnic inequality, class inequality and so on 
because of the potential impact of these on the values and assumptions of the knower.  The issue 
that has been raised by some feminist thinkers, however, is the potential for this approach to 
hermetically seal each intersectionally-formed group of knowers off from the others, e.g. 
fundamentally separating the views of black lesbian feminists from white heterosexual feminists.  
That is to say, treating the understandings of knowers in that way seems to assume that members of 
each group are trapped in their perspective such that interactions with others simply result in each 
side retaining their pre-existing viewpoint.  Useful moves have been made by thinkers such as Susan 
Strickland (1994) and Sylvia Walby (2001) to challenge the idea of ‘epistemological chasms’ (to use 
Walby’s phrase).  Strickland and Walby argue, in different ways, for the importance of engagement 
between perspectivally-shaped sets of understandings because that will help these to develop.  My 
proposal here is that these conceptual moves could be further advanced by interaction with the 
Analysis-based idea of collaboration. 
As outlined in OBSI, collaboration is seen as crucial to Analysis because it allows inquirers to 
formulate the auspices, the grounds, of their understandings.  The model is not simply of ‘ego’ 
speaking but a collaboration between ‘ego’ and ‘alter’ to help formulate the auspices of the other 
and develop their understandings further (see particularly Chapter 1 of McHugh et al, 1974).  Such 
an orientation has the reflexive character that feminist constructionists wish to incorporate within 
their work.  But it is also explicitly oriented to engagement with the other and to the development of 
a perspective, rather than to stasis.  This understanding of the productive nature of dialogical 
collaboration can be further augmented by reference to the work of Charles Taylor, whose ideas 
have strong affinities with those of the Analysis school.  In particular, it is possible to draw on 
Taylor’s idea that the process of engagement should not be treated as one that necessarily leaves 
one or both sets of understandings intact, but instead should generate a ‘language of perspicuous 
contrast’ (Taylor, 1985: 125).  By relating sets of understandings through this language of contrast it 
may become apparent that one or both is in need of revision, thus introducing a dynamic of 
development.  Proponents of Analysis would surely add that this new language of contrast will need 
to have its own auspices formulated through collaborative Analysis, and this is a further legitimate 
part of the ongoing work of developing understanding.  Although only briefly characterised here, 
these conceptual resources may help feminist thinkers who are critical of the atomisation of 
different viewpoints to conceptualize alternative ways of relating. 
Is there something that feminist constructionism can contribute to Analysis in order to reciprocate?  
I would argue that there is.  When members of the Analysis school are undertaking a reflexive 
analysis, their tendency is to focus on features like shared ‘forms of life’ (or later, the ‘lifeworld’), the 
auspices of which have to be located through Analysis.  It seems to me that feminist constructionism 
can help to take this forward through its concern with the way in which those who share a form of 
life may, nevertheless, be positioned in different ways within that form of life due to social 
inequalities.  In OBSI, McHugh et al reject an approach which argues that ‘thinking is “caused” by 
“things” like society, groups, classes, and world views’ (McHugh et al, 1974: 17).  In my view this 
critique of a reductionist approach to the sociology of knowledge is justified.  Nevertheless, if one 
treats inequalities not as ‘things’ but as meaning-based features of a form of life, their relevance 
should be acknowledged insofar as positions of advantage and disadvantage are not shared by all, 
but differentiate members.  As well as raising moral issues, these inequalities impact on what can be 
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thought and said by different members, their ‘possibilities’, and this is something that deserves 
further investigation. 
It would be fair to acknowledge that at least one proponent of the Analysis school has explored 
some of the issues around the complexity of the community in relation to inequality.  McHugh 
(2005) addresses the inequalities brought about in the USA by slavery and considers the on-going 
relevance of such inequalities in relation to debates about affirmative action.  Although this is 
undoubtedly an insightful analysis, McHugh’s focus is on the justification for affirmative action 
rather than on the way that inequality impacts on the auspices of different members of the 
community.  It is a concern with the latter that I would suggest feminist constructionism can help 
Analysis to develop.5   
Of course, it would be inconsistent of me to argue that in adopting a concern with the stratification 
of a form of life and the impact of this on the perspectives of members, Analysis should resort to the 
idea that differently-located individuals have distinct, sealed-off perspectives on the world, each 
sub-group having its own bounded set of understandings or indeed auspices.  This would be to 
recommend the adoption of an approach that I have just questioned in relation to feminist 
constructionism.  What seems more plausible is that there is some degree of shared understanding 
and some degree of differentiated understanding between different members of a form of life, and 
these different understandings are not self-validating and self-sustaining but can be challenged and 
developed through interaction with others, including collaboration.   
I have argued in this chapter that both feminist constructionism and Analysis already share a range 
of presuppositions.  What I have suggested in this concluding section is that both feminist 
constructionism and Analysis can nevertheless benefit from taking into account aspects of the 
other’s approach.   
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